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Abstract 
 
The importance of the front-end decision-making phase in projects is increasingly 
recognised. This area is under-represented in the literature, but there are some key issues 
during this stage. This paper looks at some of these themes, including: the need for 
alignment between organisational strategy and the project concept; dealing with 
complexity, particularly systemicity and interrelatedness within project decisions; 
consideration of the ambiguity implicit in major projects; accounting for psychological 
and political biases within benefits and costs estimation; consideration of the social 
geography and politics within decisionmaking groups; and preparation for the 
turbulence within the project environment, including maintaining strategic alignment. 
 
Issues in front-end decision-making on projects 
 
The importance of the front-end decision-making phase in projects is being increasingly 
recognised – the need to “do the right project” is on a par with “doing the project right”. This 
area is under-represented in the literature, but there are a number of key themes that run 
throughout, identifying key issues or difficulties during this stage. This paper looks at some of 
these themes, and includes: the need for alignment between organisational strategy and the 
project concept; dealing with complexity, in particular the systemicity and interrelatedness within 
project decisions; consideration of the ambiguity implicit in all major projects; taking into 
account psychological and political biases within estimation of benefits and costs; consideration 
of the social geography and politics within decision-making groups; and preparation for the 
turbulence within the project environment, including the maintenance of strategic alignment. 
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The issue  
Projects are recognised as an important part of corporate and public life. But ask the archetypical 
“man in the street” about them, and it is clear that the reputation of projects and project-
management is that they are generally unsuccessful. A key word often associated with them in the 
public’s mind is the English colloquialism “white elephant” - something whose cost and 
subsequent upkeep is much greater to the owner than its value (deriving from the reputed practice 
of monarchs giving sacred white elephants as gifts). A newspaper article from 2005, for example, 
begins, “The Millennium Dome, the great white elephant languishing in east London….” (Wray, 
2005). Even if the result is seen to be useful, there are often reports in the media of large public 
construction projects that have suffered huge cost or time overruns, such as Denver’s $5 billion 
airport 200% overspend (Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995), or the UK’s Scottish Parliament coming 
in “10 times over budget and more than three years late” (Tempest, 2004). Pinto (2007) quotes 
from an Infoworld article  describing, “a US Army study of IT projects [that] found that 47% 
were delivered to the customer but not used; 29% were paid for but not delivered; 19% were 
abandoned or reworked; 3% were used with minor changes; and only 2% were used as 
delivered”. Moreover, while all this may be in the past, our present record seems no better. One 
of the biggest current projects in the UK is the “National Programme for IT in the National 
Health Service” with a predicted expenditure of over £12 billion during 2004 -2014. A recent 
Parliamentary report concluded, “Four years after the start of the Programme, there is still much 
uncertainty about the costs of the Programme for the local NHS and the value of the benefits it 
should achieve…The Department is unlikely to complete the Programme anywhere near its 
original schedule.” (House of Commons, 2007). 
 
This is not to say that all projects are managed badly – indeed, the management and governance 
of many projects has shown considerable improvements in recent years.  HM Treasury, for 
example, gives  an upbeat report on the UK’s Office of Government Commerce (2007) . So what 
explains this strange incongruity? Why have the study and improvements in Project Management 
resulted in such a dire reputation for projects? It is the contention of this paper that the 
concentration on project management has been much too narrow. There is more expertise now in 
delivering efficiently and successfully a well-defined pre-specified project within a clearly 
defined constant environment. This has proved very valuable in certain circumstances.  But a 
much wider view needs to be taken. The initial choice of project concept is of critical importance. 
This represents the one key decision of many made during the lifetime of a project, which is 
likely to have the largest impact on long-term success or failure. By “the project concept” we 
mean much more than just the technical solution – it includes the entire business case, all of the 
various participating organisations, and the different mechanisms and arrangements involved in 
the inter-organisational relationships (Miller and Hobbs, 2009). 
 
This paper emphasises the front-end phase of the project, when it exists only conceptually, and 
before it is planned and implemented. This phase includes all activities from the time the idea is 
conceived, until the final decision to finance the project is made - it is not an unambiguously 
defined term. The term is similar to the idea of “Quality-at-entry”, used by the World Bank 
(1996) as an indicator to characterize the identification, preparation and appraisal process that the 
projects had been subjected to upfront. It includes concept identification and selection, but not 
detailed planning stages. At this stage the consequences of decisions will be highest, while the 
information available is at its lowest. The cost inflicted by making major changes is also at its 
lowest. The importance of this stage has been known for a long time, but development here has 
been very much slower than development of tactics for the execution phase.  
 The importance of quality at entry has been emphasised in many studies, as noted in Morris 
(2009), Miller and Lessard (2001), Flyvbjerg et al (2003) and Meier (2008). The World Bank 
gave a similar message in a study based on a review of 1,125 of its projects that were evaluated 
between 1991 and 1994, concluding that projects with adequate or better identification, 
preparation and appraisal had an 80% rate, against 25% for projects that were deficient in all 
these aspects, and that the quality of preparation and appraisal had significantly more influence 
on satisfactory performance than key country macro-economic variables, external factors, or 
government considerations (World Bank, 1996).  
 
A move towards a greater emphasis on the front-end of projects is being shown in the public 
sector. Klakegg et al (2009) discuss three frameworks for governance of public projects. In the 
UK, OGC’s framework introduced the “Gateway 0” analysis (Office of Government Commerce, 
2007). The one major section of the UK public sector that uses a different framework is the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has had an “extended life-cycle”, with an extensive front-end. 
The Downey report (Ministry of Technology, 1969) put the emphasis on the early stage of 
projects, giving percentages of time and money to be spent pre-project. Two projects which were 
“triggering incidents” to better governance of MoD projects were TSR2 and the Nimrod Early 
Warning Radar projects, both cancelled after significant sums of money were spent on them.  In 
Norway  the government Quality Assurance programme (Concept, 2007) introduced an early 
QA1 process: the reference quotes “[Former practice has] been shown to be not sufficient to 
ensure that the project concept is relevant to the needs of society, and that it is the best alternative 
to meet these needs … The choice of concept is the most important decision for the project and 
for the State as project owner… The basis for QA1 is to ensure that the choice of concept is 
subject to true political governance.” (Norwegian Budget, 2005). These developments have also 
recognised a key issue for major projects - that they are established within a turbulent 
environment, where the idea of specifying a well-defined project goal, which remains constant, is 
often not applicable. Front-end planning needs to recognise and plan for this turbulence, e.g. by 
ensuring that Gateway 0’s continue intermittently throughout the project. 
 
However, many issues may arise to complicate this period of decision-making. This paper draws 
together some recent research to show the main themes which need consideration at this stage of 
the project. The paper first identifies the importance of identifying the most appropriate concept. 
Then there is a need for alignment between the project concept with overall corporate strategy 
and specific corporate goals. To achieve this, decision-makers need to make judgements about 
the future. When calculating benefits and costs, estimation is affected by certain recurring issues 
of which decision-making needs to take account. Finally, projects, once launched, do not travel a 
simple straight line, but move into a turbulent environment; this raises issues of governance and, 
particularly, the maintenance of strategic alignment. And all this has to be done up-front, when 
there is only scant information. This sequence is not a recommendation for a decision-making 
process, but simply a logical way to organise themes identified; so the paper does not provide a 
single approach, far less a single “recipe”: rather, it explores the issues involved in such decision-
making. 
 
Concepts   
In the context of projects, a “concept” is a mental construction meant to help solve a problem or 
satisfy a need. Concepts should be generic, in the sense that several concepts could be envisioned 
as alternative solutions to the same problem – all essentially different, in that they are not merely 
variants of one specific solution to the problem. A major challenge in the front-end phase is to 
identify and evaluate one, or several, viable concepts.  
 
The concept is, in many ways, concerned with the business case. The focus is on economic and 
societal, rather than technical aspects . The absence of a concept-definition phase is a deficiency 
in many projects: the concept may be decided up front without considering alternatives; it could 
be the choice of one individual, or the result of political preferences or pressure. The zero 
alternative - proceeding without major changes or new investments - may not be scrutinised to the 
same degree as alternative concepts. 
 
It is the anticipated effect of a perceived project that should guide the choice of concept, rather 
than the present undesired situation. We do not have a strong tradition of identifying real 
alternative concepts as the basis for designing projects. As a result, subsequent analysis, 
deliberation and decision-making is restricted to the project level. Asking for several alternative, 
viable concepts, including the zero option, challenges creativity, but might help to avoid ending 
up with a concept that is inferior compared to the present situation.  
 
Strategy drives the project - efficiency versus 
effectiveness 
 
A project has to begin with the corporate, public sector strategy. Projects and programmes are 
mechanisms for bringing about changes, in particular large one-off capital expenditures, so 
clearly there is a need to examine how strategy drives the definition of projects. It is important to 
look beyond the simple success criteria on which project-management has traditionally 
concentrated - delivering the planned output within cost and schedule - to the value that a project 
can give. Morris (2009) quotes the famous IMEC study by Miller and Lessard (2001), who 
distinguish between efficiency and effectiveness of project success, the latter pointing to the value 
generated by the project. He notes that the projects in this study were much more efficient than 
they were effective. Samset (2009) takes this distinction further, quoting a fivefold success 
criterion, widely used in international development projects: efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, 
impact and sustainability.  
 
One example of a project viable in strategic terms, but inefficient tactically, is the University 
Hospital in Oslo, Norway (Samset, 2008a). Due to emerging new technologies and added 
responsibilities, captured during the engineering phase, after the budget was decided, it was 
completed in 2000 - a year behind schedule, with considerable cost overrun, adverse newspapers 
reports and a public inquiry. Cost overrun was considerable in absolute terms, but was equivalent 
to only a few months’ operational costs for the hospital, and therefore insignificant from a 
lifetime perspective. The overall conclusion after a few years of operation was that the University 
Hospital was a highly successful project, and it would perhaps be unfair to suggest that initial 
decisions should have been able to anticipate problems with a high level of precision. 
 
More serious by far is when a project fails in strategic terms, even if it successfully produces the 
intended outputs. Strategic failure means that the choice of concept turns out to be the wrong one 
- the wrong solution to the problem in hand, or only a partial solution, sometimes creating more 
new problems than it solves. In some cases the initial problem no longer exists once the project is 
completed. One such example is an on-shore torpedo battery built inside the rocks on the northern 
coast of Norway in 2004 (Samset, 2008a). The facility is huge and complex, designed to 
accommodate as many as 150 military personnel for up to three months at a time. It was officially 
opened as planned and without cost overrun. A week later it was closed down by Parliamentary 
decision. Clearly, a potential enemy would not expose its ships to such an obvious risk: the 
concept had long since been overtaken by political, technological and military development. 
What was quite remarkable was that this project, which can only be characterised as strategic 
failure, got little attention in the media, possibly because it was a success in tactical terms. 
 
It is therefore essential to identify explicitly the strategy of the organisation, and ensure that the 
goals or objectives of any project will “further the sponsoring organization’s chosen corporate 
strategy and contribute to its overall goals”.  This is the recommendation of Cooke-Davies 
(2009), which looks at the front-end alignment of projects. Morris (2009), also, considers the 
strategy of the organisation, and the importance of developing projects to pursue this strategy, 
with emphasis on the value the project produces for the organisation, rather than simple 
efficiency of execution. In order to do this, the organisation’s needs must be made explicit.  Naess 
(2009), examines the relationship between needs analysis, goal formulation and impact 
assessment, and includes some methods for needs analysis. This also highlights some recurring 
problems with current practices, both qualitative, particularly a lack of a view of the systemicity 
within the analysis, and biases in the quantitative analysis when estimating costs and benefits. 
 
Clearly, getting this alignment right is critical to the value of a project. Samset (2009) points out 
the seriousness of “when a project fails in strategic terms, even if it successfully produces 
intended outputs. Strategic failure means that the choice of concept turns out to be the wrong 
one.” Project management has been developing in this area for some time. Turner (1993) 
describes the importance of the alignment of business strategy and portfolio, or programme, 
objectives. The Gower Handbook of Project Management has as its second chapter 
“Implementing Strategy through Programmes of projects” (Jamieson and Morris, 2008). As 
regards guidelines, Morris (2009) points out that the UK Association of Project Managers’ “Body 
of Knowledge” now “emphasises context, strategic imperative, commercial drivers, technology, 
the traditional control functions, and, not least, people; hence, the whole of Section 1 is concerned 
with how projects fit within their business/sponsor’s context.” 
 
The use of the words  “projects”, “programmes” and “portfolios” will not be debated here.  
Morris (2009) gives  this some consideration, and includes the view held by the Office of 
Government Commerce, that a key benefit of programme management is the alignment of 
projects to organisational strategy (Office of Government Commerce, 1999). The track-record of 
the projects discussed above shows that there is still some way to go, but at least these lead us to 
concentrate on the critical issues. 
 
The relationship between strategy and project management is not one-way. Morris describes how 
strategy implementation is accomplished with project management, but project management can 
also contribute to strategic management. He points out that project management’s contribution 
“can add value to the emerging strategy and ensure that benefits are reaped from its realisation.” 
The importance of project management in producing value for an organisation is discussed below, 
in the section on governance within a turbulent environment. 
Goals and alignment 
The front-end phase commences when the initial idea is conceived, and proceeds to generate 
information, consolidate stakeholders’ views and positions and arrive at the final decision as to 
whether or not to finance the project. In order to succeed in strategic terms, planners need to have 
a broad and long-term perspective, and allow different concepts to be considered. However, this 
broader perspective requires planners to look deeper into the future, where uncertainty is higher 
and conclusions more hypothetical and tentative, amplified by the fact that the front-end phase in 
large investment projects, particularly large public schemes, can extend over several years.  
 
There is a need to identify corporate goals and objectives, and to align projects  despite the 
difficulty of this in practice. Roth and Senge (1996) describe management decision-making in the 
real, complex world, classifying problems as “dynamic complexity” the underlying complexity of 
the problem situation itself, and “behavioural complexity”, the complexity of the group effect. 
The dynamic complexity in the underlying problem is overlaid,  and sometimes dwarfed, by 
issues of different stakeholders having different perceptions of reality, different understandings of 
the problem, different assumptions, values and objectives, etc. Problems which are complex in 
both dimensions are known as “wicked messes”.  
 
Projects in a typical management environment, public or private, may frequently be in such a 
“wicked mess”. “Projects are complex, ambiguous, confusing phenomena wherein the idea of a 
single, clear goal is at odds with the reality” (Linehan and Kavanagh, 2004). Indeed, Engwall 
(2002) describes the establishment of the perfectly correct goal as a “futile dream”.  
 
Winter (2009) quotes Morris: “at the front-end … we often have quite messy, poorly structured 
situations where objectives are not clear, where different constituencies have conflicting aims”. 
He then provides a well-established methodology, known as “Soft Systems Methodology”, which 
was developed by Peter Checkland, for gaining understanding about such situations, and using 
this to direct the front-end of projects. This methodology recognises the subjectivity implicit in all 
human situations, including projects, and is able to develop learning and understanding at the start 
of a project. This subjectivity is also key to the ongoing execution of projects, as participants 
make sense of a project and work towards its delivery (Weick, 1995). 
 
Considerations of goals are affected by the social geography of an organisation: thus the 
behavioural-complexity aspect of the “wicked mess” must be considered. Groups, by their very 
existence, influence decision-making, and where strong structures or  power gradients exist 
between members of an organisation, decision-making might become less rational. Perhaps the 
best known effect is “Groupthink” (Janis, 1973), where the individuals within a group conform in 
their thinking with what they think is the group consensus. Equally well known is Habermas’ 
theory of communicative rationality: where communication is dominated by discourse unfettered 
by the coercive use of power, there will be good exchange of rationality, but where power is 
being used to limit free communication, there might be failures in decision-making (Habermas, 
1984). In assessing how judgements are made about the future, consideration must also be given 
to the many aspects of the group of decision-makers within an organisation. This includes 
different levels of power, interest, credibility, difference between expressions and perceptions, the 
various aspects of social geography, etc. Miller and Hobbs (2009) expand on this, stating that the 
project concept should meet the needs of many stakeholders, both those within the project 
organisation, and those in the wider environment. Furthermore, the development of the concept is 
related to the social process of building the project consortium.  
 
The goals of the project - the benefits to be reaped - form a vital part of the business case. Cooke-
Davies (2005) shows that many companies have difficulty stating that projects are “approved on 
the basis of a well-founded business case linking the benefits of the project to explicit 
organization goals (whether financial or not)”. Many more are unable to state that they had a 
“means of measuring and reporting on the extent to which benefits have been realised at any point 
in time”. 
 
Judgements about the future  
 
Deciding organisational strategy is intimately related to making judgements about the medium 
and long-term future. The merits of detailed strategic planning are disputed by Mintzberg (1994), 
Slevin and Pinto (1989) and Christensen and Kreiner (1991). Obviously, a long-term plan is less 
likely to be implemented without major change than a short-term plan. Detailed planning is less 
meaningful if the target lies far into the future. It is essential to have enough flexibility to respond 
to situations that might occur along the way (Floricel and Miller, 2001). Planning should decide 
on the direction and strategic framework for a project, and anticipate difficulties that might occur, 
in order to prepare for and eventually make the right tactical choices.  
 
A number of issues are involved in making such judgements, some of which occur as themes 
throughout the literature.  
 
Firstly, the people involved are not supremely rational decision-makers. Real managers are 
human beings, and, at best, display “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1972). They are limited in the 
extent to which they can make a fully rational decision. Not only are they lacking complete 
information about the present, and have uncertainty about the future, but they are also limited in 
the extent to which they can solve complex problems. Indeed, as Miller and Hobbs (2009) point 
out, the assumptions underlying rational decision-making frameworks are often simply not valid 
in the circumstances of a real project. Thus such decision-makers adopt choices that are merely 
“good enough” or “satisficing” (Isenberg, 1991). Moreover, rather than evaluating projects from a 
single point at the beginning, with full information about costs and benefits, many project 
sponsors look at projects from “evolutionary perspectives” (Miller and Hobbs). Here sponsors are 
seen to act as champions, “shaping projects in response to” changes in the environment.  
 
A further reason for bounded rationality, which particularly affects projects, is the existence of 
cognitive biases natural to humans. How these biases can be involved in estimating the costs and 
plans of projects is discussed in the next section. They also affect views of the future and the 
benefits likely to be gained from a project. Flyvbjerg (2009) offers extensive evidence of project 
benefit overestimation and cost underestimation. He describes the biases involved, dividing them 
into technical (due to inadequate forecasting techniques or honest mistakes), psychological 
(“optimism bias”), and political-economic explanations (reasons to deliberately claim an 
optimistic view of the future). Much academic evidence for the middle category comes from the 
famous work of Kahneman and Tversky. Kirkebøen (2009) also looks at these “planning fallacy” 
biases, quoting the Sydney Opera House example. Pugh (2009) gives supporting evidence for 
such effects. Figure 1 of this paper provides an additional explanation of why forecasts may be 
“excessively optimistic”. Large projects can be of very long duration, involving judgements far 
into the future. For the public sector, this raises issues about the role of the discount rate and the 
required social rate of return (Hagen, 2009). 
 
A third aspect of the difficulty faced by boundedly-rational decision-makers in reaching 
judgements about the future, is the systemicity and interconnectedness involved in the various 
aspects (the dynamic-complexity aspect of the “wicked mess”). Parnell (2009) discusses the 
complexity of project planning, and looks at multiply-related uncertainties about the future. Van 
der Heijden’s methods (2009) explicitly address this, “actively search[ing] for predetermined 
elements in the causal systemic network in which the project is embedded”. Naess (2009) also 
cites too narrow a needs assessment as a significant problem. 
 
Finally, judgements about the future are, again, made within the social geography of the group or 
coalition, and are subject to the same effects of behavioural-complexity discussed above. Again, 
the methods outlined by van der Heijden (2009) take full account of the multiple perspectives and 
worldviews of the decision-makers. The methodology covered by Winter (2009) concurs with 
this.   
 
There is also the question of whether or not analysts’ advice is applied by decision-makers. The 
normative model for decision-making suggests that decision and analysis should follow in a 
logical and chronological sequence that will eventually lead to the selection and go-ahead of the 
preferred project, without unforeseen interventions or conflicts. In reality, the process is complex, 
less structured, and affected by chance. Analysis may be biased or inadequate. Decisions may be 
affected more by political priorities than by rational analysis. Political priorities may change over 
time. Alliances and pressures from individuals or groups of stakeholders may change. 
Information may be interpreted and used differently by different parties, the possibility for 
disinformation being considerable. 
 
Of course, judgements about the future are not one-off events at the start of a project, but 
continue as it proceeds into the future. This will be discussed in the section on the turbulent 
environment of the project. 
 
Estimating the project  
A key element of judgement about the project is the estimation of its cost and schedule – a 
fundamental part of project management, but one which seems to pose unique difficulties for 
major projects. While cost overrun is a question of doing the project right (efficiency), 
underestimation of cost up front might affect the much larger issue of choosing the right project 
(effectiveness). Flyvbjerg (2009) examines the various reasons behind the “pervasive 
misinformation” which persistently trouble project estimation – not only technical explanations, 
such as inadequate data or lack of experience, but the main headings of optimism bias and 
strategic underestimation of costs. In many cases, underestimation of cost is done on purpose: 
underbidding might significantly improve the chance of the project being considered. Once “on 
the list” it stands a better chance of being implemented. Decision-makers demonstrate a 
surprising degree of tolerance for what is accepted up front, without repercussion for the involved 
parties. This is so common that we talk not only of systematic underestimation but of 
normalisation of deviance (Pinto, 2006). Ultimately, this implies a culture where fundamental 
requirements regarding reliability and validity of information is neglected, and decision-makers 
no longer see a reason to trust the figures presented. This means that inferior projects that would 
otherwise have been dismissed stand a better chance of being approved.  
 
Underestimation represents a considerable problem, particularly in public investment projects. An 
inflation of the budget from the first estimate of 1000% or more is not uncommon. Cost estimates 
typically develop as illustrated in Figure 1. The plot often ends up in a characteristic S shape. 
Cost estimates are low in the initial period before the first systematic estimates of costs are 
undertaken. With time, the information basis improves, and the first surprises come to light. This, 
in turn, triggers greater focus on effort, and demands for greater openness and realistic estimates, 
often by independent appraisals. The cost estimate rises rapidly to the level at which it should 
have been at the outset. Thereafter, minor modifications are made until the final budget is 
approved. The dashed line at the top of Figure 1 illustrates the development of cost in the front 
end phase as it should have been, had the process started with an estimate at a realistic level. The 
difference between the dashed and solid lines is called strategic underestimation.  
 Strategic underestimation is often of an entirely different order than the cost increases when the 
project is implemented, which might typically be in the range of 10–20%. Furthermore, it often 
leads to a “double dip”/ “double jeopardy” effect, so that the project costs more than had it been 
estimated correctly (Williams, 2005). A further interesting observation is that cost overrun when 
a project is implemented may have considerable negative consequences for project managers, 
although it is unlikely that anyone will be made accountable for grave underestimation of costs up 
front. This problem is further compounded by overestimating benefits at an early stage, as 
depicted in Figure 2. The initial forecast is high, and may be scaled down during the front-end 
phase. After the project is completed, benefits, which may be expressed in terms of sales figures 
or market demand, prove to be much less than expected. After a period, the demand might 
increase and stabilize, establishing strategic overestimation of benefits. Of course, since the 
benefit/cost ratio is commonly used as a decision criterion, the picture is distorted in favour of the 
project. A cost estimate half of what is realistic, combined with an estimate of benefit that is 
double, results in an anticipated benefit/cost ratio four times as high as it should be. 
 
           FIGURE 1 HERE  
           FIGURE 2 HERE  
 
There is reason to believe that this type of bias, due either to errors or deliberate manipulation of 
information, is a prime reason why many poor projects are chosen. In some cases, the bias is so 
large that further consideration of the project would have been unthinkable, had more realistic 
figures been presented in the first place. 
 
In both types of estimation, the gap may be explained by two situations: systematic skewed 
estimation, which is often politically motivated, and errors due to flawed information and 
methods. Flawed information and methods may result in unsystematic errors, i.e. errors in both 
directions. Whenever the estimates of several projects systematically far exceed reality, there is 
reason to suspect an imbalance, which can only be put right by an overriding requirement to make 
investigators and decision-makers more accountable.  
 
This is should not discourage the use of human estimators. While the evidence of cognitive and 
political bias is well established, there is also much evidence of the skill of experts in using innate 
tacit knowledge to estimate projects. Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2009) outline some well 
known decision heuristics, and conclude that, under the conditions of uncertainty about the future 
and systemicity encountered during the front-end of project decision-making, “heuristics provide 
a feasible way to make decisions. Contrary to the common view of heuristics as second-best 
solutions… the research program ….has provided substantial evidence that heuristics often 
achieve an astonishingly high performance using just a fraction of the time and the amount of 
information required by standard decision strategies.” Indeed, the use of purely relevant 
information can make the heuristics more robust. 
 
One key problem, ingrained in the lore of project managers, is the uniqueness of their projects. 
Project managers are accustomed to the definition: “A project is a unique venture with a 
beginning and an end, conducted by people to meet established goals with parameters of cost, 
schedule and quality” (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). They tend to think of each project as unique 
– which it may well be in many aspects. However, this view can nearly always be balanced with 
evidence from past projects. Kirkebøens (2009) reiterates Kahneman’s idea, that this means 
taking an “outside” instead of an “inside” view of the project. Flyvbjerg (2009), when considering 
what planners can do about the biases he has identified, concentrates on this idea of the “outsider” 
view, to produce the idea of Reference Class Forecasting. This technique is now well-established 
in a number of countries. Parametric forecasting is discussed by Pugh (2009), and is based on his 
experience of applying this in the public sector. This is another method of trying to avoid the 
over-reliance on project uniqueness, by bringing the evidence of past projects to bear on the 
project-estimation problem. It, too, is now common in a number of countries, particularly in the 
defence sectors. 
 
The calculation of uncertainties and likelihood of risks is crucial to the estimation in any project. 
Wright (2009) discusses the difficulties that humans – including so-called “experts” – encounter 
in making such assessment, and how estimation can be improved. This difficulty is particularly 
acute in projects, where much uncertainty is epistemic (due to a lack of knowledge), rather than 
aleatoric (due solely to probabilistic uncertainty). Bedford (2009) divides the areas of uncertainty 
further, into lack of understanding about the major uncertainties and their interactions; the degree 
of project uniqueness; and the way in which future decisions will affect outcomes. He describes 
some probabilistic models for exploring the first two of these and aiding the third. The first of 
these – looking at interactions of risks, or risks under conditions of systemicity - is a significant 
problem in risk analysis. Parnell (2009) explores further the assessment of multiply-related risks. 
Of course in practice, estimates of uncertainty are made by groups, with all the same issues of 
“groupthink", consensus, politics, etc. as outlined above (Cooke, 2009). 
 
Governance in a turbulent environment  
The need to align projects with the strategy of the organisation has already been discussed. It is 
the role of project governance to ensure this: “effective governance of project management 
ensures that an organisation’s project portfolio is aligned to the organisation’s objectives, is 
delivered efficiently and is sustainable” (Association of Project Management, 2002). There is a 
growing interest in project governance, in the practical movements of governments and 
companies (see for example Klakegg et al 2009), in textbooks (see for example Müller 2009), and 
in professional societies (see for example Association of Project Management, 2002 and 2007). 
Morris (2009) emphasizes the need for project governance to ensure that projects deliver strategic 
value.  
 
The key point in this paper, however, is that the environment in which most projects operate is 
complex and turbulent, and conventional project management is not well-suited to such 
conditions. Despite the attraction of project organization to companies in fast-moving 
engironment seeking agility and responsiveness (eg Martinsuo et al 2006). Malgrati and Damiani 
(2002) point out the irony by contrasting “one of the main reasons for the spread of project 
management in companies, namely environmental complexity and uncertainty…and exposure to 
external change”, with the philosophical underpinnings of traditional project management, 
concluding, “The Cartesian clarity of inner structures clashes with the increasing porosity of 
projects to complex contexts that they seek to deny.… The risk, in short, is that the idealistic 
‘island of order’ may suddenly turn into a more realistic, very classic, ‘iron cage’”. 
 
In order for projects to be aligned with organisational strategy – and stay aligned – it is important 
to recognise the turbulence of the environment, and build in the capability to cope with this 
turbulence at the start of the project. As Miller and Hobbs (2009) discuss, this is equally 
important when the project is being undertaken by a heterogeneous consortium, or group of 
organisations, where processes and structures need to be developed to deal with turbulence. 
 
Firstly, then, flexibility needs to be built into the project strategy, both in the front-end concept 
stage, and later on. Olsson (2006) points to the need for tactical flexibility within a defined 
strategy, and Samset (2009) warns of the danger in seeking predictability: “prediction [can] 
become a prescription…it shifts the decision-maker’s focus from finding the best solution to 
…[making] his own idea or prescription come true”. Premature lock-in to an inappropriate 
concept can be a major danger to project success. 
 
It has already been suggested that projects are not a simple execution of well-developed plans, but 
are often Weickian sense-making activities, as the project management team cope with 
ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity (Weick, 1995). This sense-making within ambiguity takes 
place within the turbulent environment, making the project management task that much more 
complex. Cicmil et al (2006) contrast “traditional approaches based on rational, objective, and 
universal representations of ‘the project' with a phronetic analysis of the ambiguous, fragmented 
and political reality of project situations.”  Front-end decision-making has to develop a project 
strategy, while recognizing these ambiguities. 
 
The governance framework thus has to recognise these realities of project life, and be sufficiently 
versatile to enable projects to adapt, be flexible, and avoid premature lock-in. When there is 
restrictive “straitjacket” governance, there is a danger of projects gradually becoming unaligned 
with organisational goals. Miller and Hobbs (2005) discuss design criteria that should be brought 
to bear when developing a governance regime for a megaproject, in light of the complexity of 
such projects. Their assumption is that these would contrast with the traditional concept of 
governance as a static, binary, hierarchical process. Governance regimes for megaprojects are 
time-dependent and self-organising. Because the process is spread out over a long period of time, 
there is an opportunity to transform the governance structure as the project unfolds.  
 
This is not to say that governance framework should be unstructured. “Organizations need to 
develop two somewhat conflicting capabilities – flexibility and controllability simultaneously” 
(Biedenbach and Söderholm 2008). At it simplest, there is a clear need for staging. The OGC’s 
“Gateway 0” analysis has already been mentioned as one example. This is designed to be 
repeated periodically, to ensure that, as an ongoing strategic assessment, during which the need 
for the programme is confirmed, it is likely to achieve the desired outcomes. Morris (2009) 
discusses the role of staging and gate-keepers in the ongoing governance of a project. 
 
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) discuss ambitions and risk in megaprojects, using a large number of 
projects, and concluding that a main problem is risk-negligence and lack of accountability on 
behalf of project promoters, whose main ambition is to build projects for private gain - either 
economical or political - rather than to operate them for public benefit. Their suggested cure is (1) 
that risk and accountability should be much more centrally placed in megaproject decision-
making than currently; (2) that regulations should be in place to ensure risk analysis and 
management is carried out; (3) that the role of government should be shifted from involvement in 
project promotion to keeping an arm’s-length away, and restricting its involvement in the 
formulation and auditing of public interest objectives to be met by the megaproject; (4) that four 
basic instruments be employed to ensure accountability, by (a) ensuring transparency, (b) 
specifying performance requirements, (c) making explicit rules regulating construction and 
operations and (d) involving risk capital from private investors, the assumption being that their 
willingness to invest would be a test of the viability of the project. 
 
Scant Information 
Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2009), conclude that “less can be more”, and that having less 
information can actually help the decision-makers. This is also emphasised by Samset (2009). A 
restricted, but carefully selected sample of relevant facts and judgemental information may be an 
advantage in the effort to establish a broad overall perspective, and to identify and test alternative 
strategies. Omitting details and less relevant information helps avoid “analysis paralysis”, when 
decision-makers are presented with large amounts of detailed information too early in the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, Samset points out that accurate quantitative information 
tends to quickly become out of date, and he refers to the “half-life of information”. This is a 
problem, since the front-end phase in major projects may last for years, even decades, and include 
several parliamentary election periods with shifting governments. Klakegg et al (2009) give 
examples of this in the realm of defence. It is clear that carefully extracted qualitative information 
about a well thought-out project concept can provide reliable and valid input to the decision for 
the whole of the front-end phase. 
  
Similarly, the exposition of parametric analysis by Pugh (2009) enables the forecast to 
“concentrate upon total costs and avoid being drawn into excessive detail. To descend 
prematurely into detail is to base forecasts upon what is not yet known and can only be 
conjectured”. Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2009) also point to the danger that, in 
circumstances of uncertainty, risk and unforeseen consequences, decision-makers will give 
spurious credence to a decision made on the basis of detailed information. 
 It is also clear that bad project decisions have been made due to lack of information. Kharbanda 
and Pinto (1996) refer to the decision-making involved in the Sydney Opera House, without 
having “a basic design [or] a realistic estimate of time and cost involved. Feasibility analysis was 
almost non-existent”. However, it is an important theme of this paper that when decisions are 
made at the very front-end of a project - when uncertainty is at its highest, and available 
information most restricted - the lack of detailed information can actually be a benefit rather than 
a hindrance, in providing focus and flexibility to the decision-maker. 
 
Summary  
This paper considers issues affecting how decisions can be made at the front-end of major 
projects, in circumstances where information is usually scant. It has not been possible to consider 
all elements of a front-end analysis here. These can be found in project management handbooks, 
and include features discussed here, such as strategic analysis, analysis of needs and benefits 
(Naess, 2009), and the business case, together with further elements, including stakeholder 
analyses, scenario analysis, value management and risk analysis (Eden and Ackermann,1998, van 
der Heidjen, 2009 and Dallas, 2006). On scenario analysis, van der Heidjen states “uncertainty 
can and should be on the agenda as part of the process of deciding on committing time and 
resources to an irreversible process”; and on risk analysis,, Edition 2 of the “PRAM Guide” looks 
specifically at the “known unknowns” (Association of Project Management, 2005). Depending on 
which of the many differing interpretations is used as to where the “front-end” ceases, other 
elements may include procurement strategy, initial design/time plans and supply-chain analysis. 
 
Front-end management and project governance are increasingly popular research agenda in the 
field of project management (Williams, Samset and Sunnevåg, 2009). This paper has tried to 
offer some insight into the complexity that confronts researchers. In summing up, a number of 
issues remain to be explored, but these are not an unrelated list of issues. There is indeed a need 
for alignment between organisational strategy and the project concept. But even when this is 
achieved, it is still necessary to deal with complexity, particularly the systemicity and 
interrelatedness within project decisions, as well as the ambiguity implicit in all major projects. 
Neither establishment of strategy nor major decisions are usually taken by individuals in 
isolation, so there is a need to consider the social geography and politics within decision-making 
groups and organisational consortia. When calculating benefits and costs, estimation is affected 
by certain recurring issues, particularly psychological and political biases, the latter again based 
within the social geography and politics of the group. So these different strands – identification of 
strategy, alignment of the project, scenario planning and project estimating – are all rooted within 
the same set of organisational issues and need to be viewed as an integrative whole. Of course, 
this extends beyond the front-end into the implementation stage, and how individuals and teams 
“sense-make” during the project to try to realise the goal - after all, projects are carried out by 
groups of people, who will exhibit the effects resulting from the complex responsive relationships 
between individual humans (Stacey 2001), communicating and negotiating status and power 
relationships. Furthermore, this sense-making occurs within the turbulent environment in which 
many modern organisations find themselves; front-end decision-making also requires the design 
of organisational and governance structures which will control (maintaining strategic alignment) 
with sufficient flexibility such complex projects in such environments. There has been much 
research into each of these steps individually. Clearly though there is need for further research 
into how different organisational forms and cultures, and different project complexities and 
domains operate in all of these stages and the correlations between them.It is time to embark on 
research agenda for producing front-ends that result in the projects we actually want. 
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Figure 1. Underestimation of costs up front is commonly more dramatic than cost 
overrun when the project is implemented. The result might be that bad projects are not 
dismissed at an early stage (Samset, 2008b). 
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Figure 2. Overestimation of benefits up front is common. The realism of initial forecast 
can be verified only after the project is completed  (Samset, 2008b). 
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